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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
\\'l·~~TJ4~HN

CONTRACTING
COHPORATION (Employer)
and~~~~ PLOYE~RS MUTUAL
LIABILITY INSURANCE
CO~lPAi\Y OF WISCONSIN,
(Carrier),

Plaintiffs,

Case
No. 9970

-\'H.-

I ~DUSTRL\L COl\fl\USSION OF
UT~\II

and LEO A. DAVIS,
Defendants.

PLAINTIF'FS' BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a review of a decision of the Industrial Commission of Utah granting to defendant Leo A. Davis
compensation for permanent partial disability under the
provisions of Section 35-1-66 Utah Code Annotated 1953
as amended. The Commission granted compensation for
100 weeks, the period prescribed by the statutory schedSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ule for total loss of function of one eye. The questions
presented on appeal relate to the propriety of that award
on the facts in this case.
STATE1IENT OF FACTS
The facts are stipulated. Defendant Leo A. Davis
injured his right eye in an industrial accident. The injury is such that, without a corrective optical lens, the
right eye is essentially blind. Approximately 50% of the
eye's function is restored by the use of glasses.
DISPOSITION BELOW
The Commission awarded defendant Leo A. Davis
compensation for total blindness of one eye in accordance with the schedule incorporated in Section 35-1-66
(100 weeks).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek an order of this court declaring that
the Industrial Commission improperly assessed the disability under the statute, and that the loss of visual function should be assessed on a binocular basis with
correction.
ARGUMENT
TOTAL BLINDNESS OF AN EYE HAS NOT
OCCURRED IF SUBSTANTIAL FUNCTION
CAN BE RESTORED BY THE USE OF OPTICAL AIDS.

2
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'rhe Utah .Aet is silent as to the recognition which
should ht> given to the faet that some kinds of sense impnirment ean be greatly ameliorated by the use of appliam·t•s commonly prescribed by physicians and in general
use in our society.
The difference 1n disabling effect between a correctible and an inrorretible impairment of vision is so
mnnifl'st in our every-day experience, however, that we
can hardly assume the legislature intended the two kinds
ot' impairment to be equally compensable. The basic
premise of the compensation laws is that industry should
provide a substitute for lost earning power. The need to
wear g-lasses does not, in our society, put a workman at
appreciable disadvantage in the labor market, but a visual deficiency which cannot be restored by glasses clearly disqualifies him for many types of employment.
The Utah Act has, from the beginning, given recognition to the importance of prosthesis in reducing disability. Where industrial injury results in the loss of a
lt>g-, for instance, a substantially lesser award is provided where the stump is sufficient to permit the use
of an artificial leg (Sec. 35-1-66). It appears to be the
position of the Commission that, since the Legislature
failed to make similar provision for monocular blindness
where the mechanism of the eye can be restored to function by a lens, it is the legislative mandate that compensation be awarded for this impairment without reference
to correctibility.
"~ e believe the Commission erred In equating the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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loss of function in this case with the kinds of losses whieh
the schedule really treats. Compensation is awarded for
loss of an arm, for instance, only if the arm is amputated
or rendered useless. If an arm, otherwise useless, can be
restored to function by the insertion or a pin or plate,
compensation is awarded only upon an appraisal of the
disability after the appropriate orthopedic procedure has
been completed. While the inserted metal part may take
the place of a section of bone or joint, it is not considered
that the arm restored to function by the insertion is an
artificial arm.
The analogy between an arm so restored to use and
an eye restored to use by a lens would appear to be a
valid one. In each case, it is the injured anatomical
member which is made to function, not an artificial substitute for it. It is not generally considered that a man
who can see only with glasses is blind any more than it
is considered that a man who can walk only because of a
pin in his hip is paraplegic. The legislature did not specifically provide for the situation where monocular blindness can be relieved by a lens simply because that kind
of blindness is not blindness, in the popular concept,
at all.
The view that visual impairment should be evaluated
on a corrected basis is the one taken by almost every
court which has considered the problem. Schneider's
statement of the legal proposition is this:
''Where an injured eye is, with the aid of a proper
glass, nearly normal for many purposes, it does
4
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not amount to the loss of an eye, even though it
is undisputed that there is permanent impairment
of the vision of the eye as the result of the
injury'''
and the Pd itors of American Juris prudence say:
''Although there is some authority to the contrary,
according to most authorities, the extent of the
impairment of vision will be determined in view
of the use of glasses or such other corrective
means as are practicable; in other words, the extent of loss of vision due to an injury may be computed on the basis of the pre-injury vision as corrected by glasses. '' 2
This subject has been frequently annotated (8 ALR
1330; 7:~ ALR 716; 99 ALR 1507; 142 ALR 832) and
there is no dearth of judicial expression on the point
which concerns us. The case most frequently cited in
later decisions (and one which seems on all fours with
the instant case) is Washington Terminal Co. v. Hoage,
et al., 79 F2d 158, heard by the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia in 1935. In that case, the
injured employee demonstrated a 100% loss of vision of
the left eye and a 25% loss of vision of his right eye.
There being no evidence before the deputy commissioner
as to the remedial effect of glasses, he made findings of
disability without corrction. The employee, having received compensation for the 100% left eye and 25% right
llye impairment, then consulted an occulist who pre1

~m. R. Schneider, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, Second EdibOn. Volume II, Section 409. p. 1385.

: 58 Am Jur 785
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scribed glasses which restored the vision of the right eyp
almost completely and the left eye to 50% efficiency.
The act under which benefits were sought included a
schedule, much like the Utah schedule, which provided:
" ( 5) Eye lost, 140 weeks compensation . . . (16)
Compensation for loss of ... 80% or more of the
vision of the eye shall be the same as for loss of
eye.''
The employer applied for relief from the original
award on the basis of the changed condition. In reversing
the denial of relief by the trial court, the Circuit Court
said:
''In our opinion this decision was erroneous
for the reason that the deputy commissioner,
when passing upon the extent of Poff's vision,
should not have excluded from consideration the
assistance ·which he could receive from the use of
glasses.
The use of eyeglasses as an aid to vision is so
commonly understood and employed that no person would be considered as having lost 80 per cent
of normal Yision if at the same time by the use of
glasses he would possess 50 per cent of normal
VISIOn. Therefore, according to the reasonable
construction of the statute, it should be held that
one possessing 50 per cent efficiency of vision in
an injured eye when using glasses cannot be classified as having lost the use of 80% of the vision
of such eye.

It must be remembered that the award payable
to the employee under the statute is for '' disability" which means incapacity because of injury to
earn the wages which the employee was receiving
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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at t lH· time of injury in thP ~nnw or any other employment (~Pet ion :.!, ~nbsec. 10 of the act, 33
l'SC.\ § !Hl:! (10). The intention of the lnw is to
provide compensation for loss or disability in
earning power and not indemnity or damages for
injury to a member of the hody. It is consistent
with the purpose of that act that the disability of
an employee resulting from an injury to his eyes
should be considered with reference to the benefit
resulting from the use of glasses."
\Yhenever there has been deviation from the principle expn·s~ed in the Washington Terminal case, it has
been explained on the basis of some peculiar phrasing of
the ~tatute under which benefits are to be paid which
will not permit a construction in accordance with common sPllsl'. There is no such peculiar phrasing of the
rtah .\ct. The schedule, so far as it relates to eye injurit>s, reads as follows :
''One eye by enucleation ____________ 120 weeks
Total blindness of one eye ________ 100 weeks''
This language is entirely susceptible to the construction that the fact of blindness vel non will be determined
on a corrected basis. This court has had only one pre\inu:-: oecasion to rule on this point, and it held squarely
"ith the authorities we have cited above. In the 1921
l'HSl' of Jloray v. Industrial Commission, 58 Utah 404;
199 Pac. 1023, this court considered a claim of an employee for benefits for loss of visual function. Beginlung at page 416 of the Utah Reporter, the court cited
with approval the opinion of the Supreme Court of Michigan in the case of Cline v. Studebaker Corporation, 189
:Mich. 51!; 155 X'V 519, where that court said:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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''It is unnecessary to determine whether the
loss of 90% of the sight is substantially the loss of
the eye, because that is not the present case.
Ninety percent of the sight is not lost when. it c01n
be diminished to 50% by use of common. appliances. And it is the duty of the sufferer to minimize the injury as much as he reasonably may."
(emphasis added)
CONCLUSION
The order of the Industrial Commission in this case
that benefits be paid for impairment of vision on an uncorrected basis is out of harmony with compensation
philosophy and the specific pronouncements of this Court.
The decision should be voided by this Court.
Respectfully submitted,
CLYDE, MECHAM & PRATT

By FRANK J.

ALLEN

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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